middling and inferior ranks of people in Scotland 
gained a complete deliverance from the 
power of an aristocracy, which had always before 
oppressed them. By a union with Great 
Britain, the greater part of people of all ranks 
in Ireland would gain an equally complete 
deliverance from a much more oppressive aristocracy; 
an aristocracy not founded, like that 
of Scotland, in the natural and respectable distinctions 
of birth and fortune, but in the most 
odious of all distinctions, those of religious and 
political prejudices; distinctions which, more 
than any other, animate both the insolence of 
the oppressors, and the hatred and indignation 
of the oppressed, and which commonly render 
the inhabitants of the same country more hostile 
to one another than those of different 
countries ever are. Without a union with 
Great Britain, the inhabitants of Ireland are 
not likely, for many ages, to consider themselves 
as one people
No oppressive aristocracy has ever prevailed 
in the colonies. Even they, however, would, 
in point of happiness and tranquillity, gain 
considerably by a union with Great Britain
It would, at least, deliver them from those 
rancourous and virulent factions which are 
inseparable from small democracies, and which 
have so frequently divided the affections of 
their people, and disturbed the tranquillity of 
their governments, in their form so nearly 
democratical. In the case of a total separation 
from Great Britain, which, unless prevented 
by a union of this kind, seems very 
likely to take place, those factions would be 
ten times more virulent than ever. Before 
the commencement of the present disturbances
the coercive power of the mother-country had 
always been able to restrain those factions 
from breaking out into any thing worse than 
gross brutality and insult. If that coercive 
power were entirely taken away, they would 
probably soon break out into open violence 
and bloodshed. In all great countries which 
are united under one uniform government, the 
spirit of party commonly prevails less in the 
remote provinces than in the centre of the empire
The distance of those provinces from 
the capital, from the principal seat of the great 
scramble of faction and ambition, makes them 
enter less into the views of any of the contending 
parties, and renders them more indifferent 
and impartial spectators of the conduct of all. 
The spirit of party prevails less in Scotland than 
in England. In the case of a union, it would 
probably prevail less in Ireland than in Scotland; 
and the colonies would probably soon 
enjoy a degree of concord and unanimity, at 
present unknown in any part of the British 
empire. Both Ireland and the colonies, indeed, 
would be subjected to heavier taxes than 
any which they at present pay. In consequence
however, of a diligent and faithful 
application of the public revenue towards the 
discharge of the national debt, the greater 
part of those taxes might not be of long continuance
and the public revenue of Great 
Britain might soon be reduced to what was 
necessary for maintaining a moderate peace-establishment
The territorial acquisitions of the East-India 
Company, the undoubted right of the 
Crown, that is, of the state and people of 
Great Britain, might be rendered another 
source of revenue, more abundant, perhaps, 
than all those already mentioned. Those 
countries are represented as more fertile, more 
extensive, and, in proportion to their extent
much richer and more populous than Great 
Britain. In order to draw a great revenue 
from them, it would not probably be necessary 
to introduce any new system of taxation 
into countries which are already sufficiently
and more than sufficiently, taxed. It might, 
perhaps, be more proper to lighten than to aggravate 
the burden of those unfortunate countries, 
and to endeavour to draw a revenue from 
them, not by imposing new taxes, but by preventing 
the embezzlement and misapplication 
of the greater part of those which they already 
If it should be found impracticable for 
Great Britain to draw any considerable augmentation 
of revenue from any of the resources 
above mentioned, the only resource which 
can remain to her, is a diminution of her expense. 
In the mode of collecting and in that 
of expending the public revenue, though in 
both there may be still room for improvement, 
Great Britain seems to be at least as economical 
as any of her neighbours. The military 
establishment which she maintains for her 
own defence in time of peace, is more moderate 
than that of any European state, which 
can pretend to rival her either in wealth 
or in power. None of those articles, therefore, 
seem to admit of any considerable reduction 
of expense. The expense of the 
peace-establishment of the colonies was, before 
the commencement of the present disturbances
very considerable, and is an expense which 
may, and, if no revenue can be drawn from 
them, ought certainly to be saved altogether. 
This constant expense in time of peace, though 
very great, is insignificant in comparison with 
what the defence of the colonies has cost us 
in time of war. The last war, which was undertaken 
altogether on account of the colonies
cost Great Britain, it has already been observed
upwards of ninety millions. The Spanish 
war of 1739 was principally undertaken on 
their account; in which, and in the French 
war that was the consequence of it, Great Britain
spent upwards of forty millions; a great 
part of which ought justly to be charged to 
the colonies. In those two wars, the colonies 
cost Great Britain much more than double the 
sum which the national debt amounted to before 
the commencement of the first of them. 
Had it not been for those wars, that debt