By this constitution, it might have been 
expected, that the spirit of monopoly would 
have been effectually restrained, and the first 
of these purposes sufficiently answered. It 
would seem, however, that it had not. Though 
by the 4th of George III. c. 20, the fort of 
Senegal, with all its dependencies, had been 
invested in the company of merchants trading 
to Africa, yet, in the year following (by the 
5th of George III. c. 44), not only Senegal 
and its dependencies, but the whole coast, 
from the port of Sallee, in South Barbary, to 
Cape Rouge, was exempted from the jurisdiction 
of that company, was vested in the crown
and the trade to it declared free to all his majesty's 
subjects. The company had been suspected 
of restraining the trade and of establishing 
some sort of improper monopoly. It 
is not, however, very easy to conceive how, 
under the regulations of the 23d George II
they could do so. In the printed debates of 
the house of commons, not always the most 
authentic records of truth, I observe, however, 
that they have been accused of this. 
The members of the committee of nine being 
all merchants, and the governors and factors 
in their different forts and settlements being 
all dependent upon them, it is not unlikely 
that the latter might have given peculiar attention 
to the consignments and commissions 
of the former, which would establish a real 
For the second of these purposes, the maintenance 
of the forts and garrisons, an annual 
sum has been allotted to them by parliament
generally about L.13,000. For the proper 
application of this sum, the committee is 
obliged to account annually to the cursitor 
baron of exchequer; which account is afterwards 
to be laid before parliament. But parliament
which gives so little attention to the 
application of millions, is not likely to give 
much to that of L.13,000 a-year; and the 
cursitor baron of exchequer, from his profession 
and education, is not likely to be profoundly 
skilled in the proper expense of forts 
and garrisons. The captains of his majesty's 
navy, indeed, or any other commissioned officers
appointed by the board of admiralty
may inquire into the condition of the forts and 
garrisons, and report their observations to that 
board. But that board seems to have no direct 
jurisdiction over the committee, nor any 
authority to correct those whose conduct it 
may thus inquire into; and the captains of 
his majesty's navy, besides, are not supposed 
to be always deeply learned in the science of 
fortification. Removal from an office, which 
can be enjoyed only for the term of three 
years, and of which the lawful emoluments
even during that term, are so very small, 
seems to be the utmost punishment to which 
any committee-man is liable, for any fault
except direct malversation, or embezzlement
either of the public money, or of that of the 
company; and the fear of the punishment can 
never be a motive of sufficient weight to force 
a continual and careful attention to a business 
to which he has no other interest to attend
The committee are accused of having 
sent out bricks and stones from England for 
the reparation of Cape Coast Castle, on the 
coast of Guinea; a business for which parliament 
had several times granted an extraordinary 
sum of money. These bricks and stones, 
too, which had thus been sent upon so long
voyage, were said to have been of so bad a 
quality, that it was necessary to rebuild, from 
the foundation, the walls which had been repaired 
with them. The forts and garrisons 
which lie north of Cape Rouge, are not only 
maintained at the expense of the state, but are 
under the immediate government of the executive 
power; and why those which lie south 
of that cape, and which, too, are, in part at 
least, maintained at the expense of the state, 
should be under a different government, it 
seems not very easy even to imagine a good 
reason. The protection of the Mediterranean 
trade was the original purpose or pretence of 
the garrisons of Gibraltar and Minorca; and 
the maintenance and government of those garrisons 
have always been, very properly, committed
not to the Turkey company, but to 
the executive power. In the extent of its dominion 
consists, in a great measure, the pride 
and dignity of that power; and it is not very 
likely to fail in attention to what is necessary 
for the defence of that dominion. The garrisons 
at Gibraltar and Minorca, accordingly, 
have never been neglected. Though Minorca 
has been twice taken, and is now probably 
lost for ever, that disaster has never been imputed 
to any neglect in the executive power
I would not, however, be understood to insinuate, 
that either of those expensive garrisons 
was ever, even in the smallest degree, necessary 
for the purpose for which they were originally 
dismembered from the Spanish monarchy
That dismemberment, perhaps, never 
served any other real purpose than to alienate 
from England her natural ally the king of 
Spain, and to unite the two principal branches 
of the house of Bourbon in a much stricter 
and more permanent alliance than the ties of 
blood could ever have united them. 
Joint-stock companies, established either by 
royal charter, or by act of parliament, are different 
in several respects, not only from regulated 
companies, but from private copartneries
First, In a private copartnery, no partner 
without the consent of the company, can 
transfer his share to another person, or introduce 
a new member into the company. Each 
member, however, may, upon proper warning, 
withdraw from the copartnery, and demand 
payment from them of his share of the common 
stock. In a joint-stock company, on 
the contrary, no member can demand payment