every cause, in order to increase, as much as 
possible, the produce of such a stamp-duty
It has been the custom in modern Europe to 
regulate, upon most occasions, the payment 
of the attorneys and clerks of court according 
to the number of pages which they had 
occasion to write; the court, however, requiring 
that each page should contain so 
many lines, and each line so many words
In order to increase their payment, the attorneys 
and clerks have contrived to multiply 
words beyond all necessity, to the corruption 
of the law language of, I believe, every court 
of justice in Europe. A like temptation 
might, perhaps, occasion a like corruption in 
the form of law proceedings
But whether the administration of justice 
be so contrived as to defray its own expense
or whether the judges be maintained by fixed 
salaries paid to them from some other fund
it does not seem necessary that the person or 
persons entrusted with the executive power 
should be charged with the management of 
that fund, or with the payment of those salaries
That fund might arise from the rent of 
landed estates, the management of each 
estate being entrusted to the particular court 
which was to be maintained by it. That 
fund might arise even from the interest of a 
sum of money, the lending out of which 
might, in the same manner, be entrusted to 
the court which was to be maintained by it. 
A part, though indeed but a small part of the 
salary of the judges of the court of session 
in Scotland, arises from the interest of a sum 
of money. The necessary instability of such 
a fund seems, however, to render it an improper 
one for the maintenance of an institution 
which ought to last for ever. 
The separation of the judicial from the 
executive power, seems originally to have 
arisen from the increasing business of the 
society, in consequence of its increasing improvement. 
The administration of justice 
became so laborious and so complicated
duty, as to require the undivided attention of 
the person to whom it was entrusted. The 
person entrusted with the executive power, 
not having leisure to attend to the decision 
of private causes himself, a deputy was appointed 
to decide them in his stead. In the 
progress of the Roman greatness, the consul 
was too much occupied with the political affairs 
of the state, to attend to the administration 
of justice. A prætor, therefore, was 
appointed to administer it in his stead. In 
the progress of the European monarchies
which were founded upon the ruins of the 
Roman empire, the sovereigns and the great 
lords came universally to consider the administration 
of justice as an office both too laborious 
and too ignoble for them to execute 
in their own persons. They universally
therefore, discharged themselves of it, by appointing 
a deputy, bailiff, or judge
When the judicial is united to the executive 
power, it is scarce possible that justice 
should not frequently be sacrificed to what is 
vulgarly called politics. The persons entrusted 
with the great interests of the state 
may even without any corrupt views, sometimes 
imagine it necessary to sacrifice to those 
interests the rights of a private man. But 
upon the impartial administration of justice 
depends the liberty of every individual, the 
sense which he has of his own security. In 
order to make every individual feel himself 
perfectly secure in the possession of every 
right which belongs to him, it is not only necessary 
that the judicial should be separated 
from the executive power, but that it should 
be rendered as much as possible independent 
of that power. The judge should not be 
liable to be removed from his office according 
to the caprice of that power. The regular 
payment of his salary should not depend upon 
the good will, or even upon the good economy 
of that power
Of the Expense of public Works and public Institutions
The third and last duty of the sovereign or 
commonwealth, is that of erecting and maintaining 
those public institutions and those 
public works, which though they may be in 
the highest degree advantageous to a great 
society, are, however, of such a nature, that 
the profit could never repay the expense to 
any individual, or small number of individuals
and which it, therefore, cannot be 
expected that any individual, or small number 
of individuals, should erect or maintain. 
The performance of this duty requires, too, 
very different degrees of expense in the different 
periods of society
After the public institutions and public 
works necessary for the defence of the society, 
and for the administration of justice, both of 
which have already been mentioned, the other 
works and institutions of this kind are chiefly 
for facilitating the commerce of the society
and those for promoting the instruction of 
the people. The institutions for instruction 
are of two kinds: those for the education of 
the youth, and those for the instruction of 
people of all ages. The consideration of the 
manner in which the expense of those different 
sorts of public works and institutions 
may be most properly defrayed will divide this 
third part of the present chapter into three 
different articles