war, they are all of them naturally disposed 
to muster themselves under his banner, rather 
than under that of any other person; and his 
birth and fortune thus naturally procure to 
him some sort of executive power. By commanding
too, the united force of a greater 
number of people than any of them, he is best 
able to compel any one of them, who may 
have injured another, to compensate the 
wrong. He is the person, therefore, to whom 
all those who are too weak to defend themselves 
naturally look up for protection. It is 
to him that they naturally complain of the 
injuries which they imagine have been done to 
them; and his interposition, in such cases, is 
more easily submitted to, even by the person 
complained of, than that of any other person 
would be. His birth and fortune thus naturally 
procure him some sort of judicial authority
It is in the age of shepherds, in the second 
period of society, that the inequality of fortune 
first begins to take place, and introduces 
among men a degree of authority and subordination
which could not possibly exist before. 
It thereby introduces some degree of 
that civil government which is indispensably 
necessary for its own preservation; and it 
seems to do this naturally, and even independent 
of the consideration of that necessity
The consideration of that necessity comes, no 
doubt, afterwards, to contribute very much to 
maintain and secure that authority and subordination
The rich, in particular, are necessarily 
interested to support that order of 
things, which can alone secure them in the 
possession of their own advantages. Men of 
inferior wealth combine to defend those of 
superior wealth in the possession of their property
in order that men of superior wealth 
may combine to defend them in the possession 
of theirs. All the inferior shepherds and 
herdsmen feel, that the security of their own 
herds and flocks depends upon the security of 
those of the great shepherd or herdsman
that the maintenance of their lesser authority 
depends upon that of his greater authority
and that upon their subordination to him depends 
his power of keeping their inferiors in 
subordination to them. They constitute
sort of little nobility, who feel themselves interested 
to defend the property, and to support 
the authority, of their own little sovereign
in order that he may be able to defend 
their property, and to support their authority
Civil government, so far as it is instituted for 
the security of property, is, in reality, instituted 
for the defence of the rich against the poor
or of those who have some property against 
those who have none at all. 
The judicial authority of such a sovereign
however, far from being a cause of expense
was, for a long time, a source of revenue to 
him. The persons who applied to him for 
justice were always willing to pay for it, and 
a present never failed to accompany a petition. 
After the authority of the sovereign
too, was thoroughly established, the person 
found guilty, over and above the satisfaction 
which he was obliged to make to the party, 
was likewise forced to pay an amercement to 
the sovereign. He had given trouble, he had 
disturbed, he had broke the peace of his lord 
the king, and for those offences an amercement 
was thought due. In the Tartar governments 
of Asia, in the governments of 
Europe which were founded by the German 
and Scythian nations who overturned the 
Roman empire, the administration of justice 
was a considerable source of revenue, both to 
the sovereign, and to all the lesser chiefs or 
lords who exercised under him any particular 
jurisdiction, either over some particular tribe 
or clan, or over some particular territory or 
district. Originally, both the sovereign and 
the inferior chiefs used in exercise this jurisdiction 
in their own persons. Afterwards, 
they universally found it convenient to delegate 
it to some substitute, bailiff, or judge
This substitute, however, was still obliged to 
account to his principal or constituent for the 
profits of the jurisdiction. Whoever reads the 
instructions[47] which were given to the judges 
of the circuit in the time of Henry II. will 
see clearly that those judges were a sort of 
itinerant factors, sent round the country for 
the purpose of levying certain branches of the 
king's revenue. In those days, the administration 
of justice not only afforded a certain 
revenue to the sovereign, but, to procure 
this revenue, seems to have been one of the 
principal advantages which he proposed to obtain 
by the administration of justice
This scheme of making the administration 
of justice subservient to the purposes of revenue
could scarce fail to be productive of several 
very gross abuses. The person who applied 
for justice with a large present in his 
hand, was likely to get something more than 
justice; while he who applied for it with a 
small one was likely to get something less. 
Justice, too, might frequently be delayed, in 
order that this present might be repeated. 
The amercement, besides, of the person complained 
of, might frequently suggest a very 
strong reason for finding him in the wrong
even when he had not really been so. That 
such abuses were far from being uncommon
the ancient history of every country in Europe 
bears witness
When the sovereign or chief exercises his 
judicial authority in his own person, how 
much soever he might abuse it, it must have 
been scarce possible to get any redress; because 
there could seldom be any body powerful 
enough to call him to account. When he 
exercised it by a bailiff, indeed, redress might 
sometimes be had. If it was for his own benefit