with regard to wheat, the home market 
is thus opened to foreign supplies, at prices 
considerably lower than before. 
By the same statute, the old bounty of 5s. 
upon the exportation of wheat, ceases so soon 
as the price rises to 44s. the quarter, instead 
of 48s. the price at which it ceased before; 
that of 2s. 6d. upon the exportation of barley
ceases so soon as the price rises to 22s. 
instead of 24s. the price at which it ceased before; 
that of 2s. 6d. upon the exportation of 
oatmeal, ceases so soon as the price rises to 
14s. instead of 15s. the price at which it ceased 
before. The bounty upon rye is reduced 
from 3s. 6d. to 3s. and it ceases so soon as 
the price rises to 28s. instead of 32s. the price 
at which it ceased before. If bounties are as 
improper as I have endeavoured to prove 
them to be, the sooner they cease, and the 
lower they are, so much the better. 
The same statute permits, at the lowest 
prices, the importation of corn in order to be 
exported again, duty free, provided it is in the 
mean time lodged in a warehouse under the 
joint locks of the king and the importer. This 
liberty, indeed, extends to no more than 
twenty-five of the different parts of Great 
Britain. They are, however, the principal 
ones; and there may not, perhaps, be warehouses 
proper for this purpose in the greater 
part of the others. 
So far this law seems evidently an improvement 
upon the ancient system
But by the same law, a bounty of 2s. the 
quarter is given for the exportation of oats
whenever the price does not exceed fourteen 
shillings. No bounty had ever been given 
before for the exportation of this grain, no 
more than for that of pease or beans
By the same law, too, the exportation of 
wheat is prohibited so soon as the price rises 
to forty-four shillings the quarter; that of 
rye so soon as it rises to twenty-eight shillings; 
that of barley so soon as it rises to 
twenty-two shillings; and that of oats so soon 
as they rise to fourteen shillings. Those several 
prices seem all of them a good deal too 
low; and there seems to be an impropriety
besides, in prohibiting exportation altogether 
at those precise prices at which that bounty
which was given in order to force it, is withdrawn
The bounty ought certainly either to 
have been withdrawn at a much lower price
or exportation ought to have been allowed at 
a much higher
So far, therefore, this law seems to be inferior 
to the ancient system. With all its 
imperfections, however, we may perhaps say 
of it what was said of the laws of Solon, that 
though not the best in itself, it is the best 
which the interest, prejudices, and temper of 
the times, would admit of. It may perhaps 
in due time prepare the way for a better. 
When a nation binds itself by treaty, either 
to permit the entry of certain goods from one 
foreign country which it prohibits from all 
others, or to exempt the goods of one country 
from duties to which it subjects those of 
all others, the country, or at least the merchants 
and manufacturers of the country
whose commerce is so favoured, must necessarily 
derive great advantage from the treaty
Those merchants and manufacturers enjoy
sort of monopoly in the country which is so 
indulgent to them. That country becomes a 
market, both more extensive and more advantageous 
for their goods: more extensive, because 
the goods of other nations being either 
excluded or subjected to heavier duties, it 
takes off a greater quantity of theirs; more 
advantageous, because the merchants of the 
favoured country, enjoying a sort of monopoly 
there, will often sell their goods for a better 
price than if exposed to the free competition 
of all other nations. 
Such treaties, however, though they may be 
advantageous to the merchants and manufacturers 
of the favoured, are necessarily disadvantageous 
to those of the favouring country
A monopoly is thus granted against them to 
a foreign nation; and they must frequently 
buy the foreign goods they have occasion for, 
dearer than if the free competition of other 
nations was admitted. That part of its own 
produce with which such a nation purchases 
foreign goods, must consequently be sold 
cheaper; because, when two things are exchanged 
for one another, the cheapness of the 
one is a necessary consequence, or rather is 
the same thing, with the dearness of the other. 
The exchangeable value of its annual produce, 
therefore, is likely to be diminished by 
every such treaty. This diminution, however, 
can scarce amount to any positive loss, 
but only to a lessening of the gain which it 
might otherwise make. Though it sells its 
goods cheaper than it otherwise might do, it 
will not probably sell them for less than they 
cost; nor, as in the case of bounties, for a 
price which will not replace the capital employed 
in bringing them to market, together 
with the ordinary profits of stock. The trade 
could not go on long if it did. Even the favouring 
country, therefore, may still gain by 
the trade, though less than if there was a free 
Some treaties of commerce, however, have 
been supposed advantageous, upon principles 
very different from these; and a commercial 
country has sometimes granted a monopoly of