I apprehend, be disputed by any reasonable 
person. But it has been thought by many 
people, that it tends to encourage tillage, and 
that in two different ways; first, by opening a 
more extensive foreign market to the corn of 
the farmer, it tends, they imagine, to increase 
the demand for, and consequently the production 
of, that commodity; and, secondly, 
by securing to him a better price than he 
could otherwise expect in the actual state of 
tillage, it tends, they suppose, to encourage 
tillage. This double encouragement must, 
they imagine, in a long period of years, occasion 
such an increase in the production of 
corn, as may lower its price in the home market
much more than the bounty can raise it, 
in the actual state which tillage may, at the 
end of that period, happen to be in. 
I answer, that whatever extension of the 
foreign market can be occasioned by the bounty 
must, in every particular year, be altogether 
at the expense of the home market; as every 
bushel of corn, which is exported by means of 
the bounty, and which would not have been 
exported without the bounty, would have remained 
in the home market to increase the 
consumption, and to lower the price of that 
commodity. The corn bounty, it is to be observed
as well as every other bounty upon exportation
imposes two different taxes upon 
the people; first, the tax which they are obliged 
to contribute, in order to pay the bounty
and, secondly, the tax which arises from 
the advanced price of the commodity in the 
home market, and which, as the whole body 
of the people are purchasers of corn, must, in 
this particular commodity, be paid by the 
whole body of the people. In this particular 
commodity, therefore, this second tax is by 
much the heaviest of the two. Let us suppose 
that, taking one year with another, the 
bounty of 5s. upon the exportation of the 
quarter of wheat raises the price of that commodity 
in the home market only 6d. the bushel
or 4s. the quarter higher than it otherwise 
would have been in the actual state of 
the crop. Even upon this very moderate supposition, 
the great body of the people, over 
and above contributing the tax which pays 
the bounty of 5s. upon every quarter of wheat 
exported, must pay another of 4s. upon every 
quarter which they themselves consume. But 
according to the very well informed author of 
the Tracts upon the Corn Trade, the average 
proportion of the corn exported to that consumed 
at home, is not more than that of one 
to thirty-one. For every 5s. therefore, which 
they contribute to the payment of the first 
tax, they must contribute L.6, 4s. to the payment 
of the second. So very heavy a tax 
upon the first necessary of life must either reduce 
the subsistence of the labouring poor
or it must occasion some augmentation in 
their pecuniary wages, proportionable to that 
in the pecuniary price of their subsistence. So 
far as it operates in the one way, it must reduce 
the ability of the labouring poor to educate 
and bring up their children, and must, 
so far, tend to restrain the population of the 
country. So far as it operates in the other, 
it must reduce the ability of the employers of 
the poor, to employ so great a number as they 
otherwise might do, and must so far tend to 
restrain the industry of the country. The extraordinary 
exportation of corn, therefore, occasioned 
by the bounty, not only in every 
particular year diminishes the home, just as 
much as it extends the foreign market and 
consumption, but, by restraining the population 
and industry of the country, its final tendency 
is to stint and restrain the gradual extension 
of the home market; and thereby, in 
the long-run, rather to diminish than to augment 
the whole market and consumption of 
This enhancement of the money price of 
corn, however, it has been thought, by rendering 
that commodity more profitable to the 
farmer, must necessarily encourage its production
I answer, that this might be the case, if the 
effect of the bounty was to raise the real price 
of corn, or to enable the farmer, with an equal 
quantity of it, to maintain a greater number 
of labourers in the same manner, whether liberal
moderate, or scanty, than other labourers 
are commonly maintained in his neighbourhood
But neither the bounty, it is evident
nor any other human institution, can 
have any such effect. It is not the real, but 
the nominal price of corn, which can in any 
considerable degree be affected by the bounty
And though the tax, which that institution 
imposes upon the whole body of the people
may be very burdensome to those who pay it, 
it is of very little advantage to those who receive 
The real effect of the bounty is not so much 
to raise the real value of corn, as to degrade 
the real value of silver; or to make an equal 
quantity of it exchange for a smaller quantity, 
not only of corn, but of all other home made 
commodities; for the money price of corn regulates 
that of all other home made commodities
It regulates the money price of labour
which must always be such as to enable the 
labourer to purchase a quantity of corn sufficient 
to maintain him and his family, either 
in the liberal, moderate, or scanty manner, in 
which the advancing, stationary, or declining 
circumstances of the society, oblige his employers 
to maintain him. 
It regulates the money price of all the 
other parts of the rude produce of land
which, in every period of improvement, must 
bear a certain proportion to that of corn
though this proportion is different in different 
periods. It regulates, for example, the money 
price of grass and hay, of butcher's meat, of